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HESIODIC PERSONIFICATIONS IN PARMENIDES A 37

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At *De Natura Deorum* 1.11.28 (= DK 28 A 37),[1] Cicero's speaker Velleius first describes that deity who presides over, then identifies several other divine inhabitants of, Parmenides' World of Seeming:

> nam Parmenides quidem commenticium quiddam: coronae simile efficit (στεφάνην appellat), continentem ardorum et lucis orbem qui cingit caelum, quem appellat deum; in quo neque figuram divinam neque sensum quisquam suspicari potest. multaque eiusdem modi monstra: quippe qui bellum, qui discordiam, qui cupiditatem ceteraque generis eiusdem ad deum revocat, quae vel morbo vel somno vel oblivione vel vetustate delentur . . .

Developing an idea of Karl Reinhardt, Karl Deichgräber took these words as evidence that Parmenides populated his world of *doxa* with personified abstracts arranged in antithetical pairs.[2] The essentials of his interpretation (with my own comments appearing in brackets) were these: besides *bellum*, *discordia* and *cupiditas*, which appear as the Latin equivalents of the Greek abstracts Πόλεμος, Ἔρις and Ἔρως [or perhaps Φιλότης], Parmenides included in his cosmology "others of the same sort" (*ceteraque generis eiusdem*), i.e., "other personifications," which were themselves "destroyed" (*delentur*) by Disease, Sleep, Forgetfulness and Old Age, the words *morbo*, *somno*,

[1]Texts of the Presocratic philosophers are cited from the tenth edition of H. Diels and W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin 1961), hereafter abbreviated as "DK."

[2]K. Reinhardt, *Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie* (Frankfurt am Main 1959²) 17 f.; K. Deichgräber, "Parmenides' Auffahrt zur Gottin des Rechts," *Akad. der Wiss. und Lit. Mainz* 11 (1958) 711 ff.

oblivione and *vetustate* representing the Greek Νοῦσος [or perhaps Ἄλγεα[3]], Ὕπνος, Λήθη and Γῆρας. The unnamed "other" personifications which stood counter to these last four negative powers would presumably have been the positive forces of Health [or perhaps simply Gladness if *morbo* = Ἄλγεα in its sense of "mental distress, grief"], Waking [or perhaps something like Conscious Reflection/Wisdom if *somno* refers to a state of reduced mental capacity, cf. note 14, below], Memory and Youth. The possibility that Parmenides constructed such a system cannot for any *a priori* reason be excluded or, as Deichgräber points out, even be considered unlikely, because Empedocles—who was unquestionably influenced by Parmenides' poem[4]—apparently described the world of sense perception (i.e., the equivalent in his system of Parmenides' World of Seeming) in just this way.[5] With DK 28 B 9 ("when all things have been named light and night, and things corresponding to their powers have been assigned to each . . .") in mind, Deichgräber (again following Reinhardt's lead) went even further and suggested that Parmenides had grouped his two classes of abstracts under the primary qualities, Light and Night. Here, both commentators have obviously placed great weight on the fact that in the *Theogony*, Hesiod relegated to the family of the goddess Night all of the deities (or at least their semantic equivalents[6]) which Velleius mentions. The (unnamed) "other" personifications which stood opposed to the forces listed by Cicero's speaker would, as Reinhardt first implied, have been associated with Light.

In his book on Parmenides, Leonardo Tarán rejected this theory of contrary potencies, asserting that ultimately there was "no evidence"

[3]Homer uses the word ἄλγεα in his description of the plague at *Il.* 1.110 and ἀλγέω regularly means "to be sick" in later writers (cf., e.g., Hdt. 4.68).

[4]The *Suda* (s.v. Ἐμπεδοκλῆς) informs us that E. had actually heard Parmenides; Simplicius (DK 31 A 7) that he emulated him. See also Raven's comments in G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge 1957) 323 ff.

[5]Cf. DK 31 B 122–23: ἔνθ' ἦσαν Χθονίη τε καὶ Ἠλιόπη ταναῶπις,
Δῆρίς θ' αἱματόεσσα καὶ Ἁρμονίη θεμερῶπις,
Καλλιστώ τ' Αἰσχρή τε, Θόωσά τε Δηναίη τε,
Νημερτής τ' ἐρόεσσα μελάγκουρός τ' Ἀσάφεια.
Φυσώ τε Φθιμένη τε, καὶ Εὐναίη καὶ Ἔγερσις,
Κινώ τ' Ἀστεμφής τε, πολυστέφανός τε Μεγιστώ
καὶ Φορύη, Σωπή τε καὶ Ὀμφαίη . . .

[6]Although not appearing in the *Theog.*, Πόλεμος has the same semantic associations as the Μάχαι of 228.

to support it.[7] That such evidence does, however, exist (although considered by neither Reinhardt nor Deichgräber) I hope to show in what follows. I hope to do so, moreover, in a way which will shed a measure of new light not only on Parmenides' poem but also on an important aspect of the *Theogony*, viz., Hesiod's use of personification.

Hesiod's first concern in the *Theogony* is to isolate Zeus and to exalt his divinity. From line 383 to the end, therefore—even before the god's birth has actually been recounted—Hesiod deals almost exclusively with the development of his monarchy. First comes the account of Zeus' alliance with Styx (383 ff.); next the birth story proper with its description of Zeus liberating his father's imprisoned siblings (453 ff.); finally comes the account of Zeus' pact with the Hundred-Handers and his victories over the rebellious Titans and Typhoeus (617 ff.), the crowning military achievements in his rise to power. By no means, however, is Hesiod content merely to elevate Zeus to a position of unchallenged preeminence in the world. At the end of the poem he attempts to explain in greater detail what the god himself represents. This task he accomplishes in large part by incorporating into his catalogue of Zeus' better known family members (886 ff.) a number of deities whose names also designated a variety of abstract qualities. By way of either matrimony or paternity, Hesiod links Zeus with Μῆτις/Wisdom (his first wife); Θέμις/Established Custom (his second wife); Εὐνομίη/Good State of Law, Δίκη/ Justice, Εἰρήνη/Peace (known collectively as the Ὧραι, the products of his union with Themis); the Μοῖραι/Fates (his daughters by the same marriage); Ἀγλαΐη/Merriment, Εὐφροσύνη/Gladness, Θαλίη/Abundance (the Χάριτες, his three daughters by Eurynomê); Μνημοσύνη/ Memory (his fifth wife); Ἥβη/Youth and Εἰλείθυια/Birth[8] (his two daughters by Hera). As we might expect, the message behind these genealogical metaphors is frequently reinforced elsewhere in the Hesiodic corpus. Zeus' omniscience is reflected in the epithets μητίετα

[7]L. Tarán, *Parmenides* (Princeton 1965) 250. The Reinhardt-Deichgräber position is supported by H. Schwabl, "Zur Theogonie bei Parmenides und Empedokles," *WS* 70 (1957) 278–89.

[8]The etymology of Εἰλείθυια is uncertain. The word seems most likely, however, to be derived from a participial form of ἔρχομαι—perhaps, as Fäsi (cited by W. Leaf, ed., *Iliad* [London 1900] *ad* 11.270) long ago suggested, a personification of "the woman's time that is come."

and μητιόεις, which Hesiod applies to that god alone. His link with things lawfully established manifests itself in a phrase like ἥ θέμις ἐστίν (*Th.* 396),[9] which appears in the description of Zeus' promise to reward those Titans who had helped him dethrone Kronos. At *W.D.* 279 f., Zeus is not only the "father" of Dikê (cf. 256) but is himself identified as the giver of justice. Zeus' responsibility for peace and material prosperity is implied earlier in that same poem when Hesiod tells us that his god rewards with εἰρήνη (228) and θαλίαι (231) men who give proper judgments. The everlasting memory of Zeus' regime is assured by the Muses (the products of his union with Mnêmosynê), who "sing of Zeus as they begin and end their song, how much he is the most excellent among the gods and supreme in power" (*Th.* 47 ff.). It is Zeus—not the Moirai (as at *Th.* 906)—who elsewhere (*W.D.* 669) grants "good and evil to mortal men." And as for his daughters Hêbê and Eileithyia, we read at *Th.* 949 that Zeus made Ariadne "deathless" and "unageing" (ἀθάνατον, ἀγήρων), a description which emphasizes the god's role as that cosmic power ultimately responsible for bestowing and renewing life.

Through his use of personifications at 886 ff., then, Hesiod is able to divide the concept "Zeus" into a number of sub-characteristics and sub-functions and by so doing can explain better the god's nature. (He had earlier [383 ff.] achieved a similar result by identifying Ζῆλος/Glory, Νίκη/Victory, Κράτος/Might and Βίη/Force as deities who, although not genetically related to Zeus, nevertheless "always sit at [his] side.") Such a process of diaeresis,[10] however, is only one

[9]Cf. also the phrase Διόθεν θέμις (= *fas*) at line 22 of the Hesiodic *Shield of Heracles*.

[10]For the application of this term to Hesiod's genealogizing, see F. Solmsen, *Hesiod and Aeschylus* (Ithaca 1949) 63. This reductive treatment of divinity by no means ends with Hesiod. In making each of his personifications the equivalent of but a single component of Zeus' multifaceted personality, Hesiod anticipated by two centuries Heraclitus' claim that ὁ θεός (whom he elsewhere [DK 22 B 32] identifies as Zeus) "undergoes alteration in the way that fire, when it is mixed with spices, is named according to the scent of each of them" (DK 22 B 67). Just as Heraclitus' fire could manifest itself in a variety of fragrances while at the same time retaining its essential integrity, so for Hesiod could the essence of Zeus lie within, yet at the same time transcend, each of the personified individualizations of his godhead. Parmenides as well resorted to the same expository technique. In DK 28 B 1.26 ff. and B 8.13 ff. we read that Dikê "looses not the fetters to permit [Being] to have come into being or perish"; that she and Themis are responsible for escorting the youth of the proem to his audience with the unnamed goddess; and that Anankê and Moira have fettered Being to be "entire and immovable." Commenting on these four abstracts (three of which appear as kin of Zeus in the *Theogony*), A. Mourelatos (*The Route of Parmenides* [New

way in which Hesiod uses his personified abstracts to articulate the meaning of Zeus. A second is negative predication. It is a significant fact of genealogy in the *Theogony* that the descendants of Chaos and Gaia, the world's two primal, originative substances (or states), never intermarry.[11] The most prominent members of Chaos' stock are Night and her progeny; the most prominent descendants of Gaia are Zeus and his kin. In contrast to Zeus, Night stands as a primary symbol of negativity.[12] In a way which parallels his treatment of Zeus, however, Hesiod subdivides the larger concept of Night's negativity into a number of more specific categories, represented genealogically by her personified offspring (211 ff.). The critical point to be made here is that for every negative state designated by one or more of Night's children, there is an antithetical positive counterpart among the personified wives or daughters of Zeus (cf. the schema on page 232). The notion of death, which in Night's family is represented by Μόρος, Κήρ and Θάνατος,[13] finds its counterpart in Zeus' family in Eileithyia, the birth goddess; Γῆρας, the personification of Old Age, is answered by the other daughter of Zeus and Hera, Hêbê; ignorance, a mental state whose various associations are represented by six of Night's kin Ὕπνος/Sleep, Ὄνειροι/Dreams,[14] Ψεύδεα/False-

Haven 1970] 26) concluded that we were here dealing not with distinct figures but with several "aspects or hypostases of one and the same deity." Although the deity Mourelatos had in mind was Being itself, this statement could just as easily be applied to Hesiod's portrait of Zeus. For other instances of continuity in early Greek thought, see H. Diller, "Hesiod und die Anfänge der Griechischen Philosophie," *A&A* 2 (1946) 140–51; also M. Stokes, "Hesiodic and Milesian Cosmogonies," *Phronesis* 7 (1962) 1–37, 8 (1963) 1–34.

[11]Cf. P. Philippson, "Genealogie als Mythische Form," *Symb. Oslo.* Fasc. Supplet. 7 (Oslo 1936) 8 ff.

[12]Cf. C. Ramnoux, *La Nuit et les Enfants de la Nuit dans la Tradition Grecque* (Paris 1959) 84. In making Night the negative counterpart of Zeus, Hesiod may be reflecting—while at the same time trying to discredit—a contemporary belief that Night's power was as extensive as that of Zeus. For Night's importance in other early Greek world views, see Kirk-Raven (above, note 4) 19 ff.

[13]It is not easy to distinguish Hesiod's three personifications of death. Thanatos is the most general of the terms, whereas Moros implies death as the allotted portion of man's life and Kêr (perhaps) a violent death. For the etymological details, see P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Grecque* (Paris 1968–) s. vv. Like F. Jacoby (ed., *Hesiodi Theogonia* [Berlin 1930] 151) and others, I regard the Moirai and Kêres of 217 as post-Hesiodic additions to the text. Unlike their appearance at 904, the presence of the Moirai here is at odds with Hesiod's goal of making Zeus the supreme power in the cosmos. The Kêres seem an unnecessary duplication of the Kêr in 211.

[14]The act of sleeping not only entails a suspension of rational mental activity (cf., e.g., Heraclitus' theory of intelligence, DK 22 A 16) but also makes the mind susceptible to the unreal—and often deceitful (cf. *Il.* 2.1 ff.)—world of dreams.

hoods, Λόγοι/Tall Tales,[15] Ἀπάτη-Φιλότης/Deceit (of a clandestine sexual relationship),[16] is countered by Zeus' (first) wife, Mêtis; the Disrespect for Established Custom which Μῶμος personifies finds its antithesis in Zeus' (second) wife, Themis;[17] the physical discomfort designated by Ὀιζύς/Grief, Πόνος/Pain of Physical Toil, Ἄλγεα/ Pain (of Disease? cf. note 3, above) and Λιμός/Hunger corresponds negatively to that sense of physical comfort suggested by the names of the three Graces (Gladness, Merriment, Abundance); Νέμεσις/ Retributive Punishment and Ὅρκος/Oath, the personified consequences of injustice[18] (the word ἀδικία itself being metrically impossible), stand opposed to Zeus' daughter Dikê, the first of the Hôrai; the numerous aspects of discord which Night's family includes, Ἔρις/Strife, Νείκεα/Quarrels, Ἀμφιλλογίαι/Disputes, Μάχαι/ Battles, Φόνοι/Murders, Ἀνδροκτασίαι/Manslaughters and Ὑσμῖναι/ Tumults, are directly antithetical to the second of the Hôrai, Eirênê; the State of Bad Law (Δυσνομίη) and Ruin (Ἄτη) which derives therefrom[19] appear in their positive form in Eunomiê, the name of the third Hôrê; and Λήθη, the personification of Forgetfulness or Oblivion, is countered by Zeus' (fifth) wife, Mnêmosynê. Hesiod's purpose in constructing such a system of opposites is not far to seek. By divorcing Zeus genealogically—and, by extension, in every other way as well—from the least pleasant facts of human existence, he is again able to emphasize the positive aspects of the Olympian dispensation. Through his use of personifications at 886 ff., Hesiod explains what Zeus is; through his use of (genealogically distinct) personifications at 211 ff., he makes it clear what Zeus is not.[20]

[15]So M. L. West, *Hesiod Theogony* (Oxford 1966) *ad* 229 (hereafter cited as "West").

[16]It was apparently standard even in antiquity to take Apatê and Philotês as a sort of hendiadys. Cf. the scholium *ad* 224 (in L. Di Gregorio, ed., *Scholia Vetera in Hesiodi Theogoniam* [Milan 1975]).

[17]For the opposition between these two terms contrast *W.D.* 135 ff. (where we read that it is θέμις to make sacrifices on the altars of the gods) with *W.D.* 755 f. (where we are enjoined not "to make a mockery [μωμεύειν] of the holy services").

[18]For Horkos as a punitive force, cf., e.g, *W.D.* 217 ff. (where Oath is described as "keeping pace with unjust judgments" [σκολιῇσι δίκῃσιν]). Like Nemesis (*Th.* 223), Horkos is also termed a πῆμα (*W.D.* 804).

[19]Hesiod emphasizes the inseparability of these two conditions by describing them as "living together" (συνήθεας, 230). For Atê as "ruin" see *W.D.* 231, 413.

[20]The Zeus of *Th.* 886 ff. emerges as a polymorph deity (cf. note 10, above) who, to look beneath the work's genealogical metaphors, both embodies in and generates from his own person every positive aspect of the human condition. Nowhere in the poem,

It is not surprising that Hesiod's treatment of Zeus should have taken such a form; on the contrary, his presentation reflects two basic features of human intellection. Since any quality can more fully be appreciated and, therefore, can more effectively be defined when it is viewed together with its opposite, it made good sense for Hesiod to present the positive aspects of Zeus' character in conjunction with their negative counterparts (cf. Heraclitus' dictum that "disease makes health pleasant and good, hunger satiety, exertion rest" [DK 22 B 111]).[21] The early Greek evidence for diaeresis is also everywhere observable, appearing in art, for example (as Bruno Snell and others have pointed out[22]), in that stark articulation of limbs which so typifies the human figures found on Geometric pottery. Even if, however, Hesiod's personification-based portrait of Zeus derives its form from an innate human tendency to polarize and subcategorize complex sense data, the content of the heuristic structure itself remains the product of his own creative genius. Of the 43 personifications considered here, only ten (Themis, the Moirai, Hêbê, Eileithyia, Kêr, Thanatos, Oneiroi, Hypnos, Eris, Atê) appear

however, does Hesiod discuss the practical relationship between Zeus and the baneful potencies which Night produces. This omission is a serious one because it means, in effect, that he was ignoring the problem of evil's presence in the world. He undoubtedly realized that by making Zeus the supreme power in the cosmos, he would also have to make his deity responsible for all the things, both negative and positive, which appeared in it. But Hesiod—probably because he felt that the quality of men's lives was not an appropriate subject for a poem dealing almost exclusively with the gods—reserves his clarification of this issue for the *Works and Days*. In this second work, Hesiod's more developed view of Zeus' function is nowhere better observable than at 225 ff. There we read that the god never brings πόλεμος (cf. Μάχαι etc., *Th.* 228 ff.), λιμός or ἄτη (cf. *Th.* 227, 230) against men who give straight judgments (ἰθείας δίκας, cf. Δίκη *Th.* 902) but that they tend their fields in abundance (θαλίης, cf. Θαλίη *Th.* 909) and that εἰρήνη (cf. *Th.* 902) is abroad in their land. Moreover, in the unjust society the people perish (243); but in the just, the women are fertile (235). Still in evidence here is the polarized view of reality which we first saw in the *Theogony*: peace and war, abundance and hunger, justice and ruin (the consequence of injustice), birth and death are the respective characteristics of the law-abiding and lawless society just as they had characterized the families of Zeus and Night in the earlier poem. In the *Works and Days*, however, Night is forgotten and Zeus alone presides over this world of opposites, distributing good and evil as his programme of cosmic justice requires.

[21]For the significance of polarity in early Greek thought, cf. further, e.g., H. Fränkel, *Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy*, trans. by M. Hadas and J. Willis (New York 1975) 54; also G. E. R. Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy* (Cambridge 1966) 41 ff. and *passim*.

[22]B. Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind*, trans. by T. Rosenmeyer (New York 1960) 6 f.; also J. Pollitt, *Art and Experience in Classical Greece* (Cambridge 1975) 5 f. Elsewhere in the *Theogony*, this same cognitive reduction of sense data is observable in, e.g., Hesiod's treatment of the single concept of Zeus' sky weaponry—which he breaks down into βροντή, στεροπή and κεραυνός (cf. West *ad* 140).

in the Homeric epics and none of the others has left archaeologically traceable proof of a contemporary cult following. When coupled with Herodotus' statement (2.53) that ". . .Hesiod was the first to compose genealogies . . ." this evidence suggests that most of the personified abstracts in the *Theogony* owed their divine existence to him alone.[23] Equally suggestive of Hesiod's creativity is his treatment of already existing personified abstracts. For here, too, it appears certain that he modified his material in order to further his own didactic purposes.[24] As proof of this one needs only to consider some of those differences in the divine stemmata which distinguish the *Theogony* from the *Iliad*, a work which presumably represented a more traditional position on such matters.[25] (1) Themis' marriage to Zeus at *Th.* 901 is important for Hesiod because it forges a direct link between that god's dispensation and the sanctions of established (legal) custom. At *Il.* 15.87, Themis is also depicted as one of the Olympians but there is no hint that she was ever a wife of Zeus. The ever-suspicious Hera in fact treats her with a civility that would be inconceivable had she viewed Themis as a rival for her husband's affections. (2) Although not individually identified, Homer's Hôrai appear (*Il.* 5.749 ff.) as the gatekeepers of Olympus and were, to judge from their later associations with the seasons,[26] primarily concerned with agricultural matters; but Hesiod's Hôrai (*Th.* 901 ff.) personify three aspects of social/political order (Good State of Law, Justice, Peace) and have no obvious connection with either farming or the calendar. (3) By making his three Graces (*Th.* 907 ff.) the god's daughters, Hesiod indicates that Zeus was the ultimate source of men's Gladness, Merriment and Abundance. Homer knows the Charites as well, but Pasithea, the only one he identifies (*Il.* 14.269), has a name which reveals nothing about Zeus' character or dispensation. Predictably, Hesiod's list does not include her. (4) As commentators on, e.g., the Sarpedon episode (*Il.* 16.430 ff.) have often observed, Homer's Zeus sometimes appears to have little

[23]This conclusion is shared by many. Cf., e.g., K. Latte, "Hesiods Dichterweihe," *A&A* 2 (1946) 161; also Solmsen (above, note 10) 40, 66 ff.

[24]For Hesiod's other, similarly motivated reworkings of older material, cf. West *ad* 551, 711–12.

[25]Unlike Hesiod, Homer was not interested in using genealogies to explain the nature of Zeus. He therefore had no reason to tamper with the divine stemmata established and bequeathed to him by his oral poet predecessors.

[26]According to Pausanias (9.35.2), in Attica one of the Hôrai was named Thallo (after the time of plant blossoming), another Karpo (after the season of harvest).

control over the workings of fate.[27] In the *Iliad*, to be sure, the Moirai (24.49) are not directly connected with Zeus; in the *Theogony*, however, Hesiod clarifies this relationship by making his three Moirai Zeus' daughters (904 ff.)—and, by implication, subordinate to him in power. (5) Instead of tracing her origin from Night, Homer makes Atê the "eldest daughter of Zeus" (*Il.* 19.91) and in an equally un-Hesiodic way makes Eris the sister of Ares (*Il.* 4.441), thereby placing her also within the Olympian family.

The relevance of all this to our original problem should at once be clear. In the past, several commentators have called attention to Hesiodic reminiscences in the fragments of Parmenides. Schwabl has identified linguistic and structural echoes;[28] Pellikaan-Engel has concluded that the key to understanding much of Parmenides' cosmology may be found in the *Theogony*;[29] Jaeger and Dolin, moreover, have suggested that in his proem, Parmenides was playing directly on Hesiod's *Dichterweihe* as described in the *Theogony*'s opening lines:[30] just as Hesiod's Muses inspire their poet with the truth, so do Parmenides' maidens transport their unnamed youth into the presence of the goddess who will reveal to him the truth about Being. Given, then: (1) Parmenides' knowledge of Hesiod and the strong possibility that he was consciously manipulating it in his own work; (2) the close correspondence of Hesiod's personifications to those in A 37 which Velleius assigned to Parmenides' cosmology; and (3) the fact that Hesiod's contrast between (the families of) Night and Zeus—the god of the bright sky whose name is also a reflex of the I.E. word for "day"—is the equivalent of the opposition between Night and Light which Parmenides describes in B 9, a reasonable argument can, I believe, be made that Parmenides not only incorporated a system of antithetical deities into his Way of Seeming but that the inspiration for such a scheme came from Hesiod's work. It could in any case not be said of Parmenides that he lacked a motive for making such an adaptation. For by relegating Hesiod's contrary potencies to the second half of his poem, he would be able to express his opinion that such a traditional view of (the forces behind) reality had served its purpose in the past but was

[27]Cf. the remarks of, e.g., G. Calhoun in *A Companion to Homer*, edd. A. Wace and F. Stubbings (New York 1963) 449.

[28]H. Schwabl, "Hesiod und Parmenides," *RhM* 106 (1963) 134–42.

[29]M. E. Pellikaan-Engel, *Hesiod and Parmenides* (Amsterdam 1974) 95 ff. and *passim*.

[30]W. Jaeger, *Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford 1947) 92 ff.; E. Dolin, "Parmenides and Hesiod," *HSCP* 66 (1966) 140 ff.

now—in light of the new doctrine of Being which he had just expounded in the Way of Truch—no longer adequate.